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Abstract 
The subject of this paper is the analysis of an electrical transmission system with the objective of 
identifying its most critical elements with respect to failures and attacks. The methodological 
approach undertaken is based on graph-theoretical (topological) network analysis. Four different 
perspectives of analysis are considered within the formalism of weighed networks, adding to the 
purely topological analysis of the system the reliability and electrical characteristics of its 
components. In each phase of the analysis: i) a graph-theoretical representation is offered to 
highlight the structure of the most important system connections according to the particular 
characteristics examined (topological, reliability, electrical or electrical-reliability); ii) the classical 
degree index of a network node is extended to account for the different characteristics considered. 
The application of these concepts of analysis to an electrical transmission system of literature 
confirms the importance of different perspectives of analysis on such a critical infrastructure.  
 
Keywords: critical infrastructures, vulnerability assessment, electrical transmission system, 
network analysis, reliability, connectivity degree 
1. Introduction 
Engineered critical infrastructures are the systems of interest in this work. The motivation is that 
they provide the continuous flow of essential goods (e.g. energy, water, data) and services (e.g. 
banking, health care, transportation) which the welfare and security of our nations rely on. These 
critical infrastructures are subject to a set of multiple hazards and threats which must be identified 
and analyzed for optimal protection. 
Among the engineered critical infrastructures, the focus of this work is on the electrical 
transmission system and its analysis to identify the importance of the individual elements. The 
motivation is that the infrastructure for electrical transmission of most of the world‟s countries is 
aging and failing, with funding often not sufficient to repair or replace it; in this situation, there is a 
growing demand for a rational, risk-based approach to its operation and maintenance.  
A number of recent studies have addressed the assessment of vulnerability in electric power 
systems, by graph-theoretical topological investigations as in [1]-[5], physics-based models as in 
[6]-[9], agent-based modeling as in [10]. These studies all refer to the transmission system and are 
based on different conceptualizations of vulnerability [11]. Also, more sophisticated techniques 
such as polyhedral dynamics [12] and artificial intelligence-based search methods [13], [14] have 
been proposed to find critical elements and define vulnerability indices.  
The topological approach to vulnerability analysis is quite popular because in spite of its relative 
simplicity it offers the capability of identifying elements of structural vulnerability, i.e. network 
edges and nodes whose failure can induce a severe structural damage to the network through the 
physical disconnection of its parts. However, the methods based on such approach are limited from 
the point of view of the physical analysis of the electrical transmission systems, which the graphical 
networks represent; the limitations come from the fact that the analysis focuses only on the 
topological features of the network, thus neglecting its physical characteristics [15]-[17]. In this 
respect, it is important to verify the extent of these limitations and possibly overcome them by 
complementation with more detailed physical analyses on critical parts of the network [18], [19]. 
In this paper, the formalism of weighed networks is exploited to provide different graph-theoretical 
representations and analyses of a power transmission system. The aim is to contribute to reducing 
the gap between the highly conceptualized (and abstract) analyses based purely on considerations of 
the system topology and the highly detailed (and computationally demanding) simulations of 
system behavior, in order to render the overall vulnerability assessment more feasible and robust. 
The “weights” appended to the network elements are intended to capture relevant electrical and 
reliability properties of the system, so as to overcome the classical simplifying but unrealistic 
assumption that electrical flow occurs along the shortest and failure-free paths of connections. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical basis for the 
proposed perspectives of analysis. In Section 3, the work is presented from a practical point of view 
with reference to the popular IEEE RTS 96 system [20]. Section 4 contains a critical comparison of 
the four perspectives of analysis with an outlook on other perspectives. Conclusions are drawn in 
Section 5. 
2. Different perspectives of analysis 
In the present study, the system is modeled as a stochastic, weighted, undirected, connected network 
in which each electric bus is transposed into a node, linked by edges representing the overhead lines 
connecting consecutive buses. In this respect, this representation focuses on the actual topological 
structure of the power transmission network. 
Mathematically, the topological structure of the network can be represented as an undirected graph 
( , )G V E  where V  represents the set of vertexes (or nodes, or components) ( dim( )N V  is the 
number of nodes) and E  represents the set of edges ( , )i j  ( dim( )K E  is the number of edges). 
The connections are specified in an N×N adjacency matrix {aij} whose entries are 1 if there is an 
edge joining node i to node j and 0 otherwise.  
2.1. Graph-theoretical topological analysis  
The transmission network is first analyzed from a purely topological point of view. In the 
topological representation, no specification of the physical length of the edges is given. Each link is 
considered having a length equal to one and thus the distance between two nodes i and j is 
represented solely by the number of edges travelled in the path from i to j. On the basis of {aij}, it is 
possible to compute the matrix of the shortest path lengths {dij} whose generic entry dij is the 
number of edges making up the shortest path linking i and j in the network. The fact that G  is 
assumed to be connected implies that dij is positive and finite i j   and that there are ( 1) / 2N N   
distinct shortest paths among the N nodes. 
From the matrix of shortest path lengths  ijd , a new matrix  ijs  can be computed by considering 
connected only a number of SK  links with smallest values of shortest path lengths; the generic 
element 
ijs  is equal to 1 if the shortest distance connecting i and j is one of the SK  smallest values 
and 0 otherwise.  
A synthetic indicator of the topological structure of a complex network is the distribution of the 
degree (or connectivity) ki of its nodes 1,2,...,i N , the degree being defined as the number of 
edges incident to the node [21]: 
 ,  1,2,...,i ij
j N
k a i N

    (1) 
Intuitively, the degree of a node measures its influence in the graph with respect to the size of its 
immediate environment. 
2.2. Reliability analysis 
While some studies witnessed a reasonable association between the topology of the power grids and 
the robustness and stability of the power transmission systems [1], [22], [23], the relationship 
between network structure and system reliability is also of relevance. In this respect, the formalism 
of weighted networks [22] can be undertaken to account for the reliability properties of the 
transmission network system. More precisely, a reliability matrix {pij} can be introduced to describe 
the network reliability properties at a local level [24]; the generic element pij represents the 
probability of successful transmission along the edge that connects node i and j. 
Since the graph is not fully connected, the reliability matrix tends to be sparse (pij=0 for all pairs of 
nodes i and j that do not share a direct physical connection). In order to obtain a non-sparse matrix 
containing the complete information on the reliability of connection between any two pairs of 
nodes, the reliability 
ij
p  of connection between i and j through any connecting path ij  is computed 
by a method based on a combination of cellular automata (CA) and Monte Carlo (MC) sampling 
[25]. In this method, the reliability 
ij
p , i.e. the probability of a successful connection from i to j, is 
computed by MC – sampling a large number M of random realizations (MC trials) of the states of 
the connecting arcs and by CA-computing, for each realization, if a path from i to j exists; the ratio 
of the number of successful 
ij  paths over the total number of realizations computed gives the 
connection reliability from node i to node j. 
As indicator of the importance of the nodes from the reliability point of view, a reliability degree 
can be introduced as: 





k p i N

   (2) 
From the reliability analysis, a matrix  rijs  is computed on the basis of the SK  most reliable paths. 
The matrix element 
r
ijs  is equal to 1 if the connection from node i to j is one of the SK  most reliable 
connections, and 0 otherwise.  rijs  can be thought of as the reliability equivalent of the topological 
adjacency matrix {aij}. 
2.3. Electrical analysis 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the case of electrical transmission networks of interest here, 
the existing literature on vulnerability analysis largely takes a topological approach to identify the 
critical components in the network [1], [26], [5]. Even though such analyses are capable of 
identifying elements of structural vulnerability, they are limited from the point of view of the 
physical analysis of the electrical transmission system, which the networks represent. These 
limitations are all related to the fact that the analysis performed focuses only on the topological 
features of the network, thus neglecting its physical characteristics; this is not realistic for electrical 
transmission networks in which: i) the “electrical” length of a path differs from the topological 
length, depending on the difficulty (resistance) of transmission; ii) the electrical power is not 
necessarily routed through the shortest paths: rather, the transmission of power is determined by 
physical rules, e.g. Kirchoff‟s laws, nodal voltages etc.  
To practically overcome these limitations, an electrical connectivity metric was introduced within 
the weighed network formalism to capture the properties of node centrality, relative to metrics 
based on node-edge connectivity [16]. 
The electrical characteristics of the individual network elements and their interconnection 
relationships can be expressed in terms of the bus admittance matrix, busY . Inverting the sparse bus 
admittance matrix ( 0
bus
ijY   for all pairs of nodes i and j that do not share a direct physical 
connection) that incorporates Kirchoff‟s laws, a non-sparse matrix, known as impedance matrix, 
can be obtained.  
The matrix of electrical distances is then given by the magnitude  ijm  of the entries of the matrix 
busZ . Admittance is a complete expression of the extent to which a circuit allows a current to flow; 
as the absolute value of the complex admittance becomes larger, the absolute value of the complex 
impedance becomes smaller and therefore smaller bus
ij ijm Z  correspond to shorter electrical 
distances [16].  
The shortest SK  electrical distances, which can be used to define a matrix  eijs  analogous to the 
previous matrixes  ijs  and  rijs : the matrix element eijs  is equal to 1 if the connection from node i 
to j is one of the SK  values, and 0 otherwise. The computation of the connection distances between 
nodes i and j takes into account all possible paths between nodes, as in the case of the reliability 
analysis, and not only the shortest paths, as in the topological analysis.  
Based on the electrical information contained in the busZ  matrix, an indicator of the importance of 











  (3) 
The electrical centrality measure of interest to electrical engineers introduced in [16] and repeated 
in the paper quantifies that the importance of a substation as being inversely proportional to the 
Thévenin equivalent circuit seen in the substation. In other words, the electrical equivalent distance 
(Z Thévenin) between the generation nodes and the substation determines its importance. Thus, the 
importance of a substation is represented by its maximum level of short circuit power. Choosing 
this criterion to identify the importance of a node or substation in a power system implies depending 
on the number of the operating generators (node admittance). Therefore, the adopted definition of 
node importance accounts also for the actual generation dispatch.  
2.4. Electrical-reliability analysis 
As the physical reliability and electrical properties of the transmission network act together in 
shaping the behavior of the system, an analysis more complete than the previous ones would be one 
that combines the reliability and electrical characteristics together. In this view, a electrical- 
reliability distance can be associated to each pair of nodes ij, i.e. the product between the reliability 
ij
p  of connection between i and j and the corresponding electrical distance ijm .  
The SK  shortest connections define a matrix  erijs , where the generic element erijs  is equal to 1 if 
the connection from node i to j is one of the SK  values, and 0 otherwise.  
As an indicator of the importance of nodes from the electrical and reliability point of view, the 















  (4) 
As an alternative to the electrical-reliability degree, the expected electrical distance could be used to 
evaluate the importance of different network components. This measure is computed as: 
  ,  1,2,...,
ij iji
j N
e m q i N 

    (5) 
where 
ij
q  is the probability of different combinations of failures when multiple ij  paths between 
the pair of nodes i and j exist, and 
ij
m  is the electrical distance corresponding to the ij  path.  
As previously stated, the measure based on electrical distances is relevant also for dispatching 
problems aimed at reduction of power losses. In the context of the electrical – reliability analysis 
where short-term contingencies and supply continuity are the crucial factors, a complementary 
measure could be obtained by combining the reliability of lines together with the corresponding 
maximal transmission capacity. 
The further development of these indicators is beyond the purpose of this paper. 
3. Results and discussion 
Let us consider the power transmission network system IEEE RTS 96 of Figure 1 [20]. The network 
consists of 24 bus locations connected by 38 lines and transformers. Some edges (4 out of 38) are 
constituted by double physical lines; for the purpose of the analysis, however, they are treated as a 
single edge of communication so that effectively 34K  . The corresponding graph is shown in 
Figure 2. 
3.1. Graph-theoretical topological analysis 
Obviously, in the case of 34SK K   the smallest values in the matrix of the shortest path lengths 
are equal to 1, and correspond to the direct physical connections, i.e.    ij ijs a  (Figure 2). 
The first column of Table 1 reports the ranking of the nodes based on the values of their degree. As 
defined in Eq. (1), the most important nodes from a degree point of view have the largest number of 
connections to other nodes in the network; thus, nodes 9 and 10, characterized by the largest 
number of incident edges (five) are placed in the first position of the topological ranking; on the 
contrary, node 7 with only one connection, falls in the last position of the ranking. 
3.2. Reliability analysis 
Table 2, third column lists the 34SK   most reliable connections, which can be used to define a 
matrix  rijs  analogous to  ijs  defined on the basis of the smallest values of shortest path lengths in 
the topological analysis. The matrix element 
r
ijs  is 1 if the connection from node i to j is one of the 
34SK   listed in Table 2, first and second column; it is 0 otherwise. The representation of the 
connection pattern of the 34 most reliable paths is shown in Figure 3, with the node size 
proportional to the number of incident edges. It can be seen that the most reliably-connected nodes 
do not necessarily share a direct physical connection. 
The reliability-driven representation of the network connectivity shows a different pattern than the 
topological one; this is due to the fact that the computation of the reliability of the connection from 
node i to j takes into account all the possible paths linking nodes i and j, not just the shortest 
topological one. This conceptual representation of the network shows that there are several hubs 
identified as important from the reliability point of view: they are traversed by the majority of the 
most reliable paths. 
The most reliably connected area is found to be the central part of the network, concentrated around 
nodes 9, 10, 11 and 12 (which have also the highest degree, as reported in Table 1), due to direct 
physical connections, i.e. edges 9-11, 10-11, 9-12, and indirect connections, i.e. 9-10 and 11-12. On 
the other hand, several nodes appear to be disconnected from the network, forming clusters of size 
one or two. Based on these findings, the network could be made more robust by increasing the 
reliability of these clusters of critical hubs. 
Table 1, third column, provides the ranking of the reliability degree for each node. Nodes 9, 10, 11 
and 12 have the most reliable connections. The ranking is similar to the one obtained with the 
topological degree (Table 1, first column), with nodes 9, 10, 11 and 12 being the most important 
(reliable), and nodes 7 and 24 the least. This points to a strong correlation between the network 
structure and the system reliability due to the large values of connection reliability 
ij
p . 
3. 3. Electrical analysis 
Table 2, column five provides the most important paths with respect to the electrical distance. The 
edge 7-8 was identified as the most important, i.e. having the shortest electrical distance and 
therefore a larger propensity for power to flow between its connecting nodes. The tendency of 
power to flow through this edge is a consequence of the network‟s structure; as it can be seen from 
Figure 1, node 7 is a generator connected to the rest of the network only by node 8. As in the 
reliability case, both direct physical connections, i.e. edges 7-8 and 1-2, and indirect connections, 
i.e. 18-22 and 17-21 are ranked as the most important connections.  
Figure 4 shows the connection pattern realized by the 34 shortest electrical paths. The resulting 
graph has the same size as the original network in Figure 2 (24 nodes and 34 edges), and the node 
size is proportional to the number of incident edges. The electrical representation of the network 
suggests a very different structure with respect to the topological and the reliability perspectives. 
The most vulnerable area from an electrical perspective is the north-west side of the network, where 
the power flow concentrates due to Kirchoff‟s Laws. Indeed, this area contains several important 
generators (i.e. nodes 15, 16, 18, 21 and 22), and therefore there is a strong exchange of power 
among the nodes. These electrical hubs appear to be potentially more vulnerable with respect to 
faults or malicious attacks than the other network nodes. 
Table 1, fifth column provides the ranking of the nodes with respect to the electrical degree and 
shows a different prioritization of the network nodes with respect to the topological and reliability 
degrees. Nodes 18, 17 and 21 are identified as the most important from an electrical point of view, 
having the highest degree of electrical connectivity. They are ranked as being the most vulnerable 
because power is more likely to flow through these electrical hubs. In spite of that, they have small 
reliability degrees (Table 1, forth column), which expose the network to potential severe outages. 
On the contrary, node 7 is among the less critical nodes according to the electrical degree, and 
consistently, it has the smallest reliability degree. 
3.4. Electrical-reliability analysis 
The electrical-reliability representation of the connection pattern of the 34 most reliable electrical 
paths is shown in Figure 5, with the node sizes adjusted according to the number of incident edges. 
The most important edge from the electrical and reliability point of view is 7-8, which also 
represents a physical connection of the electrical transmission network analyzed (Figure 1). This 
edge, ranked as first in Table 2, sixth column is characterized by the smaller electrical distance (
78 0.1030m  ) and a relatively small reliability of 0.7409.  
Figure 5 suggests that the majority of the most vulnerable paths are those connecting the south-east 
and the north sides of the network through nodes 7 and 22; these paths are characterized by small 
values of the electrical-reliability distance. Some of the 34SK   connections include also paths 
with short electrical distance and average reliability, located in the north area of the network 
system. 
Table 1, seventh column provides the ranking of the network nodes with respect to the reliability 
and electrical properties of the network, which bears resemblance to the reliability ranking (Table 1, 
third column). This fact suggests that the reliability (and structural) characteristics have a larger 
influence upon the vulnerability of the network than the electrical characteristics. In this view, node 
7 having the smallest reliability degree (Table 1, forth column) and a relatively large electrical 
degree (Table 1, sixth column) is ranked among the most critical nodes (Table 1, eighth column). 
Nonetheless, the reliability-electrical analysis highlights criticalities complementary to the electrical 
analysis. In particular, node 16, characterized by a relatively large reliability degree (Table 1, forth 
column) and large electrical degree (Table 1, sixth column) is ranked among the critical nodes when 
combing the two characteristics (Table 1, eighth column). 
From this perspective, the core made of nodes 9, 10, 11 and 12, concentrated in the central part of 
the network, is found to be the most robust, with node 10 having the smallest electrical-reliability 
degree. On the contrary, the north side of the network appears to be the most vulnerable, with nodes 
17, 18 and 22 placed in the first positions of the electrical-reliability ranking. 
4. Choosing among the perspectives 
The four perspectives on network analysis can be framed into the broader scenario of risk analysis 
against random failures and malevolent attacks [27]-[30]. In this view, a comparative evaluation is 
proposed to determine which perspective to choose for a given circumstance. Table 3 provides a 
starting point for choosing among several perspectives on network analysis based on mutual 
comparison criteria [31], [32]. 
The major drawback of the purely topological analysis is that it relies solely on the network 
structure to assess the connectivity performance and nodes importance, and does not consider any 
physical properties nor system dynamics (first three columns of Table 3). By considering the 
connections reliability among the nodes based on the failure probabilities of the edges, the 
reliability-driven representation highlights the most reliable indirect connections, and the most 
reliably connected areas of the network. 
Nevertheless, the topological and reliability analyses fail to explicitly incorporate the physical laws 
governing the electrical flow. An electrical- or electrical-reliability-driven representation of the 
network indeed highlights the electrical hubs that appear to be more vulnerable, due to the smaller 
electrical- or electrical-reliability distances of the paths that traverse them. The incapacitation of 
these vulnerable paths causes the electrical flow to be routed along alternative paths, possibly 
triggering cascades of overloads and extensive blackouts. 
The quantification of system vulnerability indicators and the identification of its critical elements 
are the two main outputs of a vulnerability assessment. While providing complementary 
information, vulnerability indicators are parameters encompassing the static and/or dynamic 
characteristics of the whole system, whereas the identification of critical elements comes from their 
ranking with respect to their individual connectivity efficiency and/or their contributions to the 
propagation of failures, with their effects, through the system [33]. 
To properly quantify the importance and criticality of the network components, various weighted 
indicators can be defined as complements to the topological indicators. From a topological 
viewpoint, various measures of the importance of a network element (edge or node) can be found in 
the literature [34]. This centrality measures can be further extended by considering suitable 
connections weights to identify the critical components with respect to the reliability and the 
electric features [35] of the networks components. By further considering the „reliability distances‟ 
or the „electrical-reliability distances‟ among network nodes in terms of the probabilities of failure 
of the interconnecting links, or in terms of a combination of the reliability and the electrical 
properties of the links, vulnerability indicators can be defined for use in the analysis of the 
robustness of network systems.  
The „data needs‟ criterion refers to the quantity and quality of input data needed to properly perform 
the analysis. By associating the high scale to the electrical and electrical- reliability analysis we 
consider that this approaches strongly depend on a high quantity and quality of input data to provide 
reasonable outputs. On the contrary, graph-theoretical and reliability analyses rely on a minimum 
amount of information such as the adjacency matrix and the failure rate of the lines. 
The level of maturity of each perspective can be measured by the amount of available literature 
review [31]. Many application examples are found in scientific literature for the graph-theoretical 
and the electrical analysis so we assume a high level of maturity. On the contrary, a poor level of 
maturity is assigned to the electrical-reliability perspective due to the scarce experience in this field. 
We assume for the reliability analysis a middle level of maturity. 
Complexity criteria takes into account the difficulty of the algorithms and programs of the 
respective methodological approach. Two levels of complexity can be distinguished: a low level of 
complexity assigned to the graph-theoretical perspective due to the simplicity of the algorithms 
necessary to perform such an analysis and a medium level of complexity for the remaining 
perspectives. 
The „requested time‟ criterion describes the effort employed in developing the algorithms for the 
analysis, and the simulation speed. A low level can be assigned to the graph-theoretical and 
reliability analyses because of the relative small amount of time needed to build-in the algorithms 
and a fast simulation speed, while we assume a medium level for the other two analyses. 
A number of alternative approaches for the vulnerability assessment of electrical networks have 
been reported in Table 3, fifth to eight row [32]. The choice of the suitable approach depends on the 
type of system, the objective of the analysis, and the available information. For example, statistical 
analysis [36] is suitable when rich data sets about the system operation and performance are 
available. It is characterized by a high level of maturity and low level of complexity. However, the 
structure of the network under analysis may be hidden by the fact that the data are often presented 
in an aggregate form [37], [38]. Moreover, the effective use of the sets of data is difficult because 
they come from a variety of past operating conditions that may not fully reflect the situations of 
interest at present and in the future. 
Probabilistic risk assessment is another mature methodology that can be applied for analyzing 
network systems [39], [23]. It integrates deterministic and stochastic tools to carry out a systematic 
and structured evaluation of the risk associated with every life cycle aspect of a complex engineered 
technological system, which may lead to undesired consequences triggered by an accident initiating 
event. The disadvantages of this methodology arise from its complexity that leads to significant 
efforts in logic modeling and quantification, and from the limited capability of providing an 
exhaustive analysis. 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is also a suitable approach, particularly useful for situations with 
sparse or non-existent macro scale information. ABM is able to use the rich sources of micro-level 
data to develop interaction forecasts. The main disadvantages of these simulation models lie in the 
complexity of the computer programs, which tends to obscure the underlying assumptions, and in 
the inevitable input subjectivity. The high level complexity leads also to a high level of requested 
time. 
Object-oriented modeling offer also an attractive modeling paradigm for describing the dynamic 
network behavior [40]. One of the major advantages of an object-oriented approach is the 
possibility to include physical laws into the simulation. The level of modeling detail offered by the 
object-oriented approach allows analyzing a multitude of time-dependent availability aspects. The 
main problems are related to the slow simulation speed and the large number of parameters to be 
input in the analysis [18]. However, by focusing on specific safety aspects, the model can be 
simplified and the computational burden reduced. 
Based on this comparative evaluation, we propose a framework of analysis that incorporates the 
four perspectives presented in this work to be used as a preliminary screening analysis of the 
network vulnerabilities. This is reasonable since the first step in a general risk assessment is 
represented by the system characterization [41], [42]. By performing such an analysis a better 
comprehension of the system is achieved, and the different criticalities within the network 
components are highlighted. Such framework could be used as a starting point for a more detailed 
analysis, focused on the previously identified critical components. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, the analysis of an electrical transmission network system has been undertaken with the 
objective of identifying the critical components, within a vulnerability assessment frame of work. 
The electrical transmission network IEEE RTS 96 has been taken as reference to present the 
development of the analysis from four different perspectives: topological, reliability, electrical and 
electrical-reliability. 
For each perspective, the structure of the most important system connections has been identified, 
and an extended degree index has been computed for the nodes based on this structure. The three 
weighted indicators quantify the importance of the network components with reference to the role 
played by the observed characteristic (topological, reliability, electrical or electrical-reliability). 
A comparative evaluation of the four perspectives also with respect to other approaches for the 
vulnerability assessment was performed and a mechanism for choosing among them was provided. 
In particular, we found that the reliability analysis identifies the clusters of critical hubs whose 
reliabilities have to be enhanced to ensure network robustness against random failures. Moreover, 
the electrical analysis ranks as vulnerable the buses that are traversed by the greater part of the 
power flow. These electrical hubs are more vulnerable to faults or malicious attacks because their 
malfunctions lead to a large redistribution of power to other electrical routes. By comparing the 
reliability and the electrical analyses, we were able to find inconsistencies in the network design. 
Namely, nodes with large electrical degree have small reliability degrees, which expose the network 
to potential severe outages. Therefore, we suggest network modifications that increase the reliability 
degree of the nodes which have a large electrical degree. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. Degree indicators of the 24 network nodes 
Topological Degree Reliability Degree Electrical degree Electrical-reliability 
degree 
node degree node degree node degree node degree 
9 5 9 19.0939 18 0.2469 7 0.4215 
10 5 10 19.0928 17 0.2467 22 0.4149 
11 4 11 19.0926 21 0.2467 18 0.3781 
12 4 12 19.0912 15 0.2465 17 0.3622 
16 4 13 18.1300 16 0.2462 21 0.3592 
1 3 3 18.0415 22 0.2452 19 0.3515 
2 3 24 17.9313 19 0.2449 20 0.3440 
3 3 1 17.6274 24 0.2447 14 0.3317 
8 3 16 17.5905 20 0.2433 15 0.3304 
13 3 23 17.4177 23 0.2423 16 0.3238 
15 3 2 17.3933 14 0.2419 23 0.3198 
17 3 15 17.2740 13 0.2388 4 0.3176 
21 3 5 17.0725 11 0.2386 8 0.3149 
23 3 8 16.9606 12 0.2370 24 0.3133 
4 2 14 16.7865 3 0.2368 5 0.3030 
5 2 4 16.7335 9 0.2340 13 0.3029 
6 2 6 16.6817 8 0.2316 3 0.3021 
14 2 20 16.3159 7 0.2315 2 0.2985 
18 2 19 16.0972 4 0.2303 1 0.2951 
19 2 21 16.0233 1 0.2250 6 0.2914 
20 2 17 15.8838 2 0.2245 11 0.2872 
22 2 18 15.2564 5 0.2242 12 0.2858 
24 2 22 13.8271 10 0.2219 9 0.2820 
7 1 7 12.7517 6 0.2107 10 0.2678 
 



















1 2 0.8991 6 0.1505 15 - - 10 24 0.8822 16 - - - - 
1 9 0.8869 13 - - - - 11 12 0.9996 2 - - - - 
1 10 0.8870 12 - - - - 11 13 0.9389 5 - - - - 
1 11 0.8869 13 - - - - 11 23 0.8730 22 - - - - 
1 12 0.8868 14 - - - - 11 24 0.8822 16 - - - - 
2 9 0.8786 19 - - - - 12 13 0.9391 4 - - - - 
2 10 0.8787 18 - - - - 12 24 0.8821 17 - - - - 
2 11 0.8786 19 - - - - 15 16 0.8900 10 0.1506 16 - - 
2 12 0.8785 20 - - - - 15 17 - - 0.1484 11 - - 
3 9 0.8919 7 - - - - 15 18 - - 0.1470 9 - - 
3 10 0.8917 9 - - - - 15 19 - - 0.1584 28 - - 
3 11 0.8918 8 - - - - 15 21 - - 0.1455 8 - - 
3 12 0.8918 8 - - - - 15 22 - - 0.1477 10 0.1061 25 
3 22 - - - - 0.1085 32 15 24 - - 0.1535 20 - - 
3 24 0.9862 3 0.1580 25 - - 16 17 - - 0.1493 12 - - 
4 7 - - - - 0.1027 19 16 18 - - 0.1501 14 - - 
4 22 - - - - 0.1024 17 16 19 - - 0.1551 21 - - 
5 7 - - - - 0.1076 30 16 20 - - 0.1620 34 - - 
5 22 - - - - 0.1090 34 16 21 - - 0.1506 17 - - 
7 8 - - 0.1030 1 0.0763 1 16 22 - - 0.1512 18 0.1070 28 
7 14 - - - - 0.1004 13 16 24 - - 0.1606 33 - - 
7 15 - - - - 0.0999 12 17 18 - - 0.1375 4 - - 
7 16 - - - - 0.1020 16 17 19 - - 0.1575 24 0.1085 33 
7 17 - - - - 0.0891 4 17 20 - - - - 0.1062 26 
7 18 - - - - 0.0850 3 17 21 - - 0.1413 7 - - 
7 19 - - - - 0.0944 8 17 22 - - 0.1392 6 - - 
7 20 - - - - 0.0980 11 17 24 - - 0.1593 31 - - 
7 21 - - - - 0.0899 5 18 19 - - 0.1582 26 0.1024 18 
7 22 - - - - 0.0772 2 18 20 - - - - 0.1006 15 
7 23 - - - - 0.1083 31 18 21 0.8898 11 0.1366 2 - - 
8 9 0.8731 21 - - - - 18 22 - - 0.1380 5 0.1037 21 
8 10 0.8731 21 - - - - 18 23 - - - - 0.1047 23 
8 11 0.8730 22 - - - - 18 24 - - 0.1583 27 0.1065 27 
8 22 - - - - 0.1042 22 19 20 - - 0.1522 19 - - 
13 22 - - - - 0.1031 20 19 21 - - 0.1586 29 0.1075 29 
14 22 - - - - 0.1004 14 19 22 - - 0.1594 32 0.0930 7 
9 10 0.9997 1 - - - - 19 23 - - 0.1570 22 - - 
9 11 0.9997 1 - - - - 20 21 - - - - 0.1060 24 
9 12 0.9997 1 - - - - 20 22 - - - - 0.0915 6 
9 13 0.9389 5 - - - - 20 23 - - 0.1493 13 - - 
9 24 0.8826 15 - - - - 21 22 - - 0.1367 3 - - 
10 11 0.9997 1 - - - - 21 24 - - 0.1572 23 - - 
10 12 0.9997 1 - - - - 22 23 - - - - 0.0951 9 
10 13 0.9389 5 - - - - 22 24 - - 0.1592 30 0.0965 10 
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Figure 1. The IEEE RTS 96  
 
 
Figure 2. The topological graph of the IEEE RTS 96  
  
 Figure 3. The IEEE RTS 96 redrawn to highlight the structure of the 34 most reliable connections 
 
 
Figure 4. The IEEE RTS 96 redrawn to highlight the structure of the shorter electrical connections 
  
 Figure 5. The IEEE RTS 96 redrawn to highlight the structure of the most reliable electrical connections 
